cooperation of the government in supplying the army by sea; (3) march directly to San Antonio and there fortify, collect provisions, and await recruits from the United States, but it would be necessary to treat with the Comanches and gain their confidence; and (4) march immediately against Matamoros. The latter possibility seemed to Green to be the most desirable, but if a descent could not be made now upon northern Mexico, then he believed that the next best policy would be to move the army to San Antonio and prepare to advance against the line of the Río Grande in the fall.

No Mexican campaign in Texas, however, was immediately forthcoming, owing to internal strife in the interior of Mexico and to a deplorable condition within the Mexican frontier army. Felix Huston appraised the Mexican situation in a letter to Houston. The Mexican advance, he wrote, had been delayed on account of the lack of money for supplies and for the payment of the troops and on account of the unwillingness of the Mexican troops to re-enter the country they had so disgracefully left. Because of the dispersed and disorganized condition of the Mexican army, he believed a favorable opportunity now existed for Texas to subject the whole Río Grande country to conquest, and thus retaliate on Mexico for her devastation of Texas -- "make her feel the desolation of war, destroy her resources and means of again invading us -- repay our citizens for their great loss of property; and . . . aid our negotiation and make Mexico ask a peace on the terms of defraying the expenses of the war." In the negotiation, he thought, Mexico should be compelled to recognize the independence of Texas. A successful campaign against the northern frontier of Mexico, he believed, could be carried out easily by a force of 2,000 men, and the objectives of such an expedition, including the capture of Matamoros, could be accomplished in the space of one month. Such a campaign would establish the national character of the infant republic, giving it respectability both at home and abroad.[39] 

On the other hand, A. C. Allen and John J. Linn believed that any campaign against Mexico ought to await cooler weather and the outcome of the negotiations being carried on through the United States. In the event the negotiations failed or seemed to bog down, Allen informed his "fellow citizens in arms and the Volunteers from the United States" on July 23, that perhaps the best course would be to pursue